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The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection,
Not Privilege*
SHERMAN L. COHN**
Although the work-product doctrine has received considerable attention
before the courts in recent years, several issues regarding the scope and
applicability of the doctrine remain controversial As a prelude to ex-
plaining the state of the law on these issues, the author examines the
case law through which the doctrine developed and explores the doc-
trine's modern application through rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. He next discusses the rule's various requirements and its
treatment ofparticular categories of information including opinion work
product andparty statements. Finally, Professor Cohn explains how the
rule's protection may be waived and discusses the rule's operation with
respect to subsequent litigation and aparty's use of experts. The author
draws distinctions throughout the article between operation of the attor-
ney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and concludes that
the work-product doctrine operates not as aprivilege that belongs to any
party but rather as a protection for the adversary systetr.
"The provisions of Rule 26(b)(3) are straightforward and easily un-
derstood. No interpretation or construction seems necessary." Vir-
ginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68
F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ROOTS OF THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
From our common-law ancestors we inherited much. We inherited the
forms of action and a separation of law and equity. We inherited a pleading
system that required fictions and ritualistic formulas, which in some situations
demanded prolixity and in others permitted vague general statements. We
also inherited a system of litigation in which one party learned precious little
about the other party's case until trial. It was a system that Justice Douglas
described as one of "blindman's buff."' Professors Wright and Miller have
stated that the "judicial proceeding was a battle of wits rather than a search for
the truth,' 2 and, thus, each side was protected to a large extent against disclo-
sure of his case until he chose to disclose it at trial.
* © Sherman L. Cohn, 1983. All rights reserved. Permission to reprint this article must be obtained
from the author.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. in Foreign Service, Georgetown Uni-
versity (1954); J.D. Georgetown University Law Center (1957); LL.M. Georgetown University Law
Center (1960).
This article will appear as a chapter in the book Corporate Information: Confidentiality and Dis-
closability in the Lawyer-Client Context, Rothstein and Brunner, Editors, West Publishing Company
1983.
1. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
2. 8 C. WRIoHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 14 (1970).
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Reform arrived in the mid-nineteenth century with the enactment of the
Field Code.3 Abolition of the common-law forms of action was accompanied
by the procedural merger of law and equity. An attempt was made to
eliminate fictions, prolixity, and vagueness from the pleading stage of litiga-
tion. Yet, the game of blindman's buff continued because all that one knew of
his opponent's case was what was in the pleadings and the bill of particulars.
Although a party was required to furnish facts sufficient to allege a cause of
action,4 such allegations told far from the entire story.5
A major change occurred in 1938 with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The rules set forth a system of discovery which permitted one
party to obtain information about another party's evidence prior to trial. They
established devices to force disclosure from anyone, parties or nonparties, who
had knowledge of any non-privileged information that was relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the case.
Under this new philosophy the only relevant information protected from
disclosure was that falling within one of the evidentiary privileges: attorney-
client, husband-wife, physician-patient and the like. All other information was
to be disclosed upon proper demand. The game of blindman's buff was to end;
the cry of "fishing expedition" was to be ignored. All parties were to have
access to all available, relevant information, thus preventing surprise at trial.6
The sides were to be evened and, hopefully, a purer justice would emerge from
the litigation.
Questions soon arose concerning how far to extend this new philosophy of
complete disclosure. Did we really intend there to be no surprises at trial? Did
other values need to be integrated into this philosophy? The conflict that
emerged is epitomized by the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor.7 In Hickman,
a tugboat sank; five of the nine crew members were killed.8 Three days later,
the tug owners and their underwriters employed Fortenbaugh, an attorney, to
defend them against possible suits arising from the incident. Three weeks
later, a public hearing was held by the United States Steamboat Inspectors at
which the four surviving crewmembers were examined. Their recorded testi-
mony was publicly available. With an eye toward anticipated litigation,
3. 1848 N.Y. LAWS ch. 379, 497.
4. Id ch. 379, § 120 (2).
5. Although the-law courts had no discovery in today's sense of the word, an attorney could file a bill
of discovery, a cumbersome device, in an equity court for use in a law court. See Pressed Steel Car Co.
v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F. 964, 966-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Equity courts provided more discovery than
the common-law courts. See general F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 171-73 (2d ed. 1977)
(equity courts permitted bills of discovery in aid of action or defense at law, and bills to take deposition;
and compelled defendant in discovery to supply written, sworn answers to interrogatories).
6. Justice Murphy put it this way:
No longer can the time honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discov-
ery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the
time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of suprise.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
7. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8. Id at 498. The statement of facts in 1ickman appears at id at 498-99.
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Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and obtained signed state-
ments from them. Fortenbaugh also interviewed other persons whom he be-
lieved to have some information concerning the accident and in some instances
made memoranda of the conversations. Nine months after the incident, suit
was filed by a representative of one of the deceased crewmembers. A year
after filing suit, counsel for the plaintiff, through an interrogatory, asked
whether the tug owners had obtained any statement from any member of the
tug crew or of any other vessel. Counsel also asked the tug owners to attach to
their answer "exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, [to]
set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports." 9
Supplemental interrogatories broadened the request to include any oral or
written statement, record,'report or other memorandum made concerning any
matters related to the towing by the tug, the sinking, salvaging and repair of
the tug, or the death of the crew. The tug owners took exception to these
interrogatories and refused to answer.10
Read literally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit such discovery.
Rule 26(b)(1) provides for the discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . ... 11
Clearly, the information sought by the plaintiff in Hickman was relevant to the
subject matter of the action. Moreover, it did not fall within the protection of
the attorney-client privilege because it had been obtained from someone other
than the client.' 2
Further, the plaintiff in Hickman argued, to prohibit discovery of statements
obtained during counsers investigation would give a tremendous advantage to
the party who first retained counsel or had greater investigatory resources.13 If
an incident portends future litigation, the resources of a corporate party would
allow it to "pull a dark veil of secrecy over all the pertinent facts" long before
the individual party employs counsel to begin work on the matter.' 4 Plaintiff
also contended that the disputed interrogatories operated within the stated
purpose of the discovery rules: to prevent surprise; to even up the sides in their
search for information; and to encourage the full release at trial of all evidence
pertinent to the issues, thus insuring the result most reflective of the actual
events. 1
5
Although these purposes are not served to the extent that one party's attor-
ney hoards any information pertinent to the issues in a lawsuit, forcing the
hoarding attorney to disclose his information would handicap achievement of
other goals arguably central to our adversarial system: full preparation and
zealous advocacy. Disclosure of an opponent's completed litigation file would
eliminate the need for much of an attorney's personal research and investiga-
9. Id at 499.
10. Id
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules, which drastically restruc-
tured the discovery rules, did not alter this language.
12. See Bird v. Penn Central Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (attorney-client privilege applies
to information obtained from client); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-
59 (D. Mass. 1950) (same).
13. 329 U.S. at 506.
14. id at 506-07.
15. Id at 506.
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tion. Instead, he would depend on his opponent's expenditure of time, money
and energy. Certainly, there would be less incentive to make such expendi-
tures if an attorney could take full advantage of an opponent's work product.
Thus, there would no longer be a premium on complete, careful first-hand
investigation and trial preparation. Such "[p]roper preparation" demands that
counsel "assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
unduie and needless interference." 16 A rule permitting full discovery would dis-
courage the investigating counsel from taking written notes of conversations
and encourage more reliance on memory with all of its attendant difficulties.
As Justice Murphy noted in Hickman:
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop
in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.
The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the
interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served.17
These two goals-promoting fairness through full disclosure and promoting
an adversarial system ofjustice by discouraging neither counsel from full prep-
aration and zealous advocacy-had to be balanced. That balance was reached
in what has become known as the work-product doctrine: all written materials
obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel in preparation for trial or
"with an eye toward litigation" are to be free from discovery, unless "essen-
tial" to the case preparation of the party seeking discovery.18 It is the discover-
ing party's burden to establish that the information sought is no longer
available, can be reached only with undue hardship, or that there are other
adequate reasons to justify invasion of his opponent's file.' 9 Although the
Hickman Court did not decree absolute protection, it made clear that the bur-
den on the party seeking discovery was to be, at least, far greater to, discover
the memory and mental impressions of counsel than to discover written state-
ments of witnesses.20
That was 1947; the work-product doctrine was case law. For the next
twenty-three years, the lower federal courts struggled to put flesh on the doc-
trine and to work out the problems of its application. Naturally, not all of the
resolutions have been consistent.21 An attempt to resolve the conflicts resulted
16. Id at 511.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id at 511-12.
20. Id at 512-13.
21. For example, many courts interpreted the undue hardship standard as requiring a showing of
good cause. Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.RD. 37,40 (E.D.S.C. 1964) ("undue hard-
ship" and "injustice" requirements of Hickman are equated with a "good cause" showing). Other
courts, however, have confused this "good cause" standard with the "good cause" established by a
showing of relevancy, which was a prerequisite until 1970 in rule 34 for mandating the disclosure of
documents in general under rule 34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note; see Shapiro v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 429,430 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (applying the "good cause" requirement of rule 34
to requests for trial preparation materials). This result was not surprising, as requests for documents
generally are made under rule 34 and trial preparation material is normally documentary in nature.
The 1970 amendments eliminated the "good cause" requirement of rule 34.
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in a complete rewriting of the discovery rules in 1970. The work-product doc-
trine was codified and incorporated in rule 26 of the revised Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This solution left some issues unresolved and created new
ones.
One general observation concerning the work-product doctrine should be
made before turning to those matters. The Hickman v. Taylor issue was raised
in a civil case in the context of pretrial discovery. The work-product doctrine
was written into rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
solely concerns pretrial discovery in civil cases. Yet, the work-product doc-
trine is not so limited. Clearly, it applies by virtue of rule 81(a)(3) to court
proceedings "to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in
accordance with" an administrative subpoena issued by an agency or officer of
the United States.22 This position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in
Upjohn Co. v. United States.23 Thus, the doctrine applies to judicial proceed-
ings for the enforcement of subpoenas issued by the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice24 and grand juries.25
Moreover, it should be noted that the work-product doctrine also applies to
both trial situations and, in a limited fashion, to criminal cases.26 In United
States v. Nobles,27 pursuant to the trial court's order, an investigator called by
the defense as a witness in a criminal trial was precluded from giving impeach-
ment testimony absent assurances from defense counsel that the prosecutor
would be furnished those portions of the witness' investigatory report relevant
to the witness' testimony and prepared for defense counsel.28 The Supreme
Court upheld the preclusionary sanction and held that the work-product doc-
trine was applicable in criminal trial situations even though testimonial use of
work-product material generally is regarded as a waiver of that protection.29
Thus, although our focus will be on rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is with the realization that the rule's implications go beyond civil
cases and the pretrial stage of litigation.30
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3); cf. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (federal
rules dictate procedure to enforce nondiscovery IRS summonses and grand jury subpoenas, but rule
81(a)(3) does not apply substantive restrictions of rule 26 to what information grand jury or IRS may
seek to compel disclosure).
23. 499 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (applying work-product doctrine to IRS subpoena).
24. Id
25. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530 (1971); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
26. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808 (D.C. Cir.
1982); FED. R. CiuM. P. 16(b)(2). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) (limiting the application of the work-
product doctrine in criminal proceedings); FED. R. CRiM. P. 26.2 (same).
27. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
28. Id at 228-29.
29. Id at 238-40. Rules 16(a)(2) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize a
protection from discovery in criminal cases of "documents made by" the defendant, the attorney for the
government or the defendant, or by other agents, for either the government or the defendant, in connec-
tion with the investigation, prosecution or defense of the case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 26.2; 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) (Jencks Act).
30. Judge J. Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia Circuit, writing in In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793 (D.C. Cir. 1982), has suggested that the work-product doctrine in criminal cases and in enforcement
of subpoenas issued by a federal grand jury or by any other officer or agency of the United States has a
separate development, and perhaps a different substantive content than the work-product doctrine ap-
plicable to discovery in civil cases through rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id at
808, n.49. Judge Wright recognized that in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1981),
the Supreme Court "seemed to assume, without firmly holding, that Rule 26(b)(3) rather than the
1983]
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This article will address the work-product doctrine as it is embodied today
in rule 26(b)(3) and (b)(4). It will explain the rule, focus on the problems that
have surfaced since its adoption, and present various solutions offered by the
courts. No attempt is made to explain exhaustively the case law on those
problems. Decisions under the pre-1970 version of the federal rules will be
discussed only when they will be helpful to illuminate alternatives.
One further point on the scope of the work-product doctrine: no distinction
is made between in-house corporate, government or other organizational coun-
sel and outside counsel. If in-house counsel acts "primarily in the role of an
attorney advising clients," then that attorney probably will be treated in the
same manner as an outside counsel with respect to the work-product
doctrine.3'
II. WORK PRODUCT: A DEFINITION
First, it should be noted that the work-product doctrine is a restriction upon
otherwise permitted discovery. Rule 26(b)(3) begins by stating that "a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule .... 32 Rule 26(b)(1) makes discovera-
ble any nonprivileged matter relevant to the subject matter of the action.33
Although a discovery request is not objectionable on the ground that the infor-
mation sought will be inadmissible at trial, the information sought must be
reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence. 34 If this basic test is not
met, the discovery request is denied and there is no need to consider further
whether discovery is limited by the work-product rule.
A significant aspect of the basic discovery rule is that information is not
discoverable if it is privileged under the law of evidence. Most pertinent is the
attorney-client privilege, which, unless waived, protects communications relat-
ing "to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client, without the
presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing primarily either an opinion
of law or legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding, and not for the
purpose of committing a crime or a tort."35 Although information obtained by
an attorney directly from a client is, in the broad sense, work product, the
work-product doctrine encompasses much more than the attorney-client privi-
common law restricted the scope of the IRS's power to summons work product. But cf. United States v.
Moon, 616 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1980)." In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 808 n.49. Judge Wright
went on to suggest that
it is not clear that Rule 26, which by its terms applies only to discovery, should govern non-
discovery applications of the work product privilege. A better interpretation might be that the
Federal Rules dictate the procedures to be applied in proceedings to enforce IRS summonses,
or grand jury subpoenas, but that Rule 26 does not in itself supply a substantive restriction on
what the IRS or a grand jury may seek to obtain by compulsory process. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (John Doe, Inc.), 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979); Fed. R. Evid. I 101(d)(2).
Id at 808 n.49.
31. Id at 811.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
34. Smedley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D.N.H. 1971).
35. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.)
(frequently cited formulation of the attomey-client privilege). For a recent restatement of the purposes
of the attorney-client privilege, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393-96 (1981).
[Vol. 71:917
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lege: work product includes information obtained by the attorney from per-
sons other than a client.36 Moreover, the effects of the two concepts differ. The
attorney-client privilege is absolute and can be waived only by the client.
37
The work-product protection, however, is qualified and can be overcome by a
proper showing.38 And it is usually the attorney, not the client, who asserts,
waives, or forfeits work-product protection.
39
The work-product concept applies only to "documents and tangible
things."' 40 Thus, a party's mental information is not protected by the work-
product doctrine, even if that information was obtained by means that would
normally fall under work-product protection. Obviously, whatever a party
did, saw, heard, or felt may be investigated if relevant.4 1 Moreover, informa-
tion known by a party, but acquired from another person, may be discovered,
assuming, of course, that it is relevant and not privileged. Although documents
and tangible things are subject to discovery upon the proper showing under
rule 26(b)(3), 42 the opinions and mental impressions of counsel germane to the
case sub judice are rarely discoverable even if they are written or otherwise
recorded.43 Indeed, any tangible attorney work product containing opinions of
36. In the corporate setting, the application of the work-product doctrine has declined since the
Supreme Court's rejection of the control-group test for the attorney-client privilege in Upjohn, 449 U.S.
at 383. That test protected only communications between counsel and those employees of the corpora-
tion "in a position to control or. . . to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney .... Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962),petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The control-
group test would have limited the number of employees whose communications with counsel fell within
the attorney-client privilege; consequently, it expanded the number of occasions for the application of
the work-product doctrine. Now that the Supreme Court has struck down the control-group test, the
attorney-client privilege extends beyond the control group, and there are fewer occasions to apply the
work-product doctrine to communications with corporate employees. See supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text (discussing applicability of work-product doctrine to in-house counsel).
37. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2292, at 554, § 2321, at 629. (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3).
39. Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90
F.R.D. 583, 587 (N.D. IM. 1981); see also Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage (I), 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973);
Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 930 (N.D. Calif. 1976); infra notes 160-78 and
accompanying text (discussing client conduct as waiver of work-product protection).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
41. Justice Rehnquist addressed this same point in the context of the attorney-client privilege in
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383. He noted that "It]he privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it
does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney" and
quoted Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one
thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client
cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you say or write to the attorney?' but
may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorpo-
rated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See infra notes 99-134 and accompanying text (discussing overcoming
work-product protection).
43. 8 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2023, at 194 (1970). Wright &
Miller note that the courts have consistently held that the work-product doctrine does not protect
against the discovery of "facts that the adverse party's lawyer has learned, or the persons from whom he
has learned such facts, or the existence or nonexistence of documents."Id The distinct protection in
rule 26(b)(3) of documents and tangible things does not allow, however, by implication or otherwise,
for the discovery of an attorney's mental impressions whether or not contained in a tangible document.
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counsel receives a higher degree of protection 44 even if the items contain other-
wise discoverable information.45 Such opinion work product includes the at-
torney's personal recollections, 46 memoranda, 47 handwritten notes, 48 legal
opinions, 49 and litigation strategy and is discoverable only in the rarest
situations.50
There are certain situations, however, in which the attorney's files or papers
are not merely a record of some other evidence, such as the recording of a
witness' statement. They are instead facts at issue in the case. This situation
may arise when the attorney's conduct comes into question 5' or when there is a
possibility that he may be charged with participating in the pending fraud,
crime, or tort.52 Additionally, when a party claims the defense of laches, it is
material at what point in time the opposing party knew the information on
which the original claim is based.5 3 The attorney's ifies may be relevant to that
Ford v. Phillips Elec. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See infra notes 135-55 and
accompanying text (discussing enhanced protection of opinion work product).
44. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401-02 (1980).
45. Cf. Mead Data Centr., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The court stated that non-exempt portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are
"inextricably intertwined with exempt portions." Id
46. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (personal notes and
recollections from attorney's conversation protected as work product).
47. Id; Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1969) (memoranda prepared by outside counsel
protected).
48. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1968).
49. In re Natta, 410 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 836 (1969) (attorney's assess-
ment of corporation's legal position covered by work-product doctrine).
50. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1302, 1304 (D.D.C.
1974) (counsel accused of being part of securities violation).
52. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although neither of the other panel judges
joined Judge Wright in this portion of the opinion, the discussion illustrates the crime/fraud exception
to work-product protection. With respect to grand jury subpoenas, if there is a prima facie showing
that there is a "possibility that a privileged relationship has been abused," the privilege will be de-
feated. Id at 814. As long as there is a showing that "some valid relationship [exists] between the work
product under subpoena and the prima fade violation," a specific showing of criminal intent on the
part of the attorney or the party is not required to obtain discovery of an otherwise protected document.
oat 81415. Judge Wright specifically called attention to the dificlties inherent in extensive in cam-
era inspection, and thus found that the standard for defining a valid relationship between a prima facie
violation and an attorney's work product should "not be too precise or rigorous." Id at 815. Although
the In re Sealed Case standard applies to grand jury subpoenas, in trial situations Judge Wright would
"treat the prima fae determination of crime or fraud as a preliminary 
fact to be found by the court
after hearing sufficient evidence." Id at n.88; see Duplan Corp. v. Dering Milliken, 540 F.2d 1215,
1221 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Action, 410 F.
Supp. 706, 710 (D. Minn. 1975); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Union Carbide, 35 F.R.D. 520, 523-24 (D.
CoL. 1964).
53. Bird v. Penn Cent. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Such a situation may also permit an
invasion of the attorney-client privilege. By claiming laches the client may be deemed to have waived
attorney-client protection so far as otherwise privileged information is relevant to that issue. Realisti-
cally, it is the attorney who files the pleading raising the issue of laches. Presumably, however, the
attorney has acted only with the full knowledge and concurrence of the client after full explanation by
counsel of the implications of raising the issue. In case of difficulties, the party alway!s has the power to
drop the laches issue or, upon his failure to cooperate fully in discovery, to have t precluded by the
court under rule 37(). The implications for the work-product doctrine are more direct. Because coun-
sel certaily is involved in the drafting of the pleading raising laches, see FaD. R. Civ. P. I1, it is quite
easy to conclude that counsel has waived whatever work-product protection he might otherwise have
been able to claim.
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issue and therefore discoverable.5 4 A similar situation arises when counsers
specific advice is relevant to a party's claim that he acted "on advice of coun-
sel."'55 Except in the case of a written statement made specifically for counsel,
work-product protection does not exist for documentary evidence given to
counsel by a client or another person.5 6 Nor does the work-product doctrine
protect the files of an attorney when the attorney's fee is at issue.57 Presuma-
bly, work-product protection is not available when the client sues for negli-
gence or other professional malpractice. 58
III. ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION V. ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
The second major aspect of the work-product doctrine is that the document
or tangible thing must have been "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (in-
cluding his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). .. .
This provision sets forth the central requirements for the application of the
work-product doctrine. Analytically, it should be broken into two segments:
(1) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (2) by or for another
party or for that other party's representative. Although the cases often meld
these two aspects, separate consideration is more appropriate for the sake of
analysis. While examining several key cases in this area, two questions should
be kept in mind. First, how specifically identifiable must the anticipated suit
be in order to fit within the rule? Second, is the retention of counsel at the time
that a document or other tangible thing is obtained necessary for the applica-
tion of the rule?
An early case of great importance is Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Plo-
vidba,60 which involved a shipment of organs that arrived by boat in damaged
condition.61 The purchaser immediately employed a marine surveyor to inves-
tigate the cause of the damage in order to ascertain against whom - the ship-
per, the packager, or the carrier-to make a claim.62 -After the purchaser
obtained the report of the marine surveyor, he made a claim and eventually
brought suit.6 3
When the defendant sought to discover the report of the marine surveyor,
plaintiff's counsel asserted that the report fell within the protection of the
work-product doctrine.6 Judge Will overruled this objection and stated that
any report or statement made by or to a party's agent.., which has
not been requested by nor prepared for an attorney nor which other-
54. Id
55. Id at 47.
56. Balistrieri v. O'Farrell, 57 F.R.D. 567, 569 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
57. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.-Co., 66 F.R.D. 129, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
58. Cf. Bird v. Penn. Cent. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 43,46-47 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (documents discoverable when
plaintifi's counsel had sole access to relevant documents necessary to substantiate defendant's defense).
If a party is an attorney being sued for malpractice, his work product is arguably discoverable.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
60. 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
61. Idat 369.
62. Id at 373.
63. Idat 371-72.
64. Id at 369.
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wise reflects the employment of an attorney's legal expertise must be
conclusively presumed to have been made in the ordinary course of
business and thus not within the purview of the [work-product] privi-
lege .... 65
Judge Will was explicit: "no document authored prior to the consultation of
an attorney may be deemed to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation
.... *"66 In Thomas Organ there was, according to Judge Will, merely "specu-
lative contemplation of possible litigation. '67 When a party acts on his own
before consulting counsel, Judge Will's approach would "conclusively pre-
sume" that his actions are not in anticipation of litigation.68 Thus, despite the
apparently straightforward language of rule 26(b)(3) that applies work-product
protection to a document prepared "by or for another party" in anticipation of
litigation, Judge Will held that the requirements for the application of the doc-
trine are not satisfied if the party acts without counsel.6
9
This interpretation is further illustrated by Judge Layton's opinion in
Spaulding v. Denton 70 In that case a yacht sank at sea and three survivors were
rescued on December 29th.71 The insurer was advised of the accident on De-
cember 30th and immediately hired a marine investigator.72 The investigator
submitted three reports, one each on January 10th, January 21st and August
1 lth.73 The insurance company consulted counsel after receiving the January
21st report.74 On January 29th the insurer received a letter from plaintiffs
counsel advising that a claim was being made.75 During discovery, plaintiffs
counsel sought to obtain all three reports.76 Upon objection that they consti-
tuted work product prepared in anticipation of litigation, the court ruled that
the first two reports were not protected by rule 26(b)(3) because they had been
prepared before counsel was consulted.77 Because the third report had been
prepared after counsel was consulted, the court held that it fell within the pro-
tection of work product.78
Making a claim and retaining counsel were crucial to the invocation of the
work-product doctrine in Spaulding. Similarly, it has been held that mere ad-
vice concerning matters which may ultimately come to trial is not protected by
the work-product doctrine if the advice is offered prior to the time that a civil
claim is made by one party against another or the client is notified of potential
criminal liability.79
65. Id at 372 (emphasis in original).
66. Id at 373.
67. Id at 374.
68. Id at 372.
69. Id at 372-73.
70. 68 F.R.D. 342 (D. Del. 1975).
71. Id at 343.
72. Id
73. Id at 343-44.
74. Id at 346.
75. Id at 344.
76. Id at 343-44.
77. Id at 346.
78. Id Likewise, in McDougle v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1972), the Fourth Circuit held that
the work-product doctrine did not protect a report by an insurance adjuster concerning an automobile
accident because the report was prepared before counsel had been retained by the insurance company.
Id at 473.
79: In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 948-49 (E.D. Pa. 1976). A bank
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The line of cases following the Thomas Organ approach should be con-
trasted with another line of analysis, the leading case of which is Almaguer v.
Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R 80 After an accident, the railroad sent out an
investigator who prepared a report prior to the intervention of counsel.81 The
court held that the report was within the work-product protection because an-
ticipation of litigation is "undeniable" in railroad accidents. 82 This approach
was developed further in American Optical Corp. v. Medronic,8 3 which in-
volved a patent dispute that began in 1967.84 In 1968 the two companies settled
the dispute by entering into a licensing agreement in which Medtronic agreed
to pay royalties to American Optical. 85 Two years later, however, Medtronic
stopped paying and litigation followed.86 American Optical sought discovery
of a memorandum written in 1968 by a patent specialist retained by Med-
tronic.87 Medtronic's claim of work-product protection was upheld on the
ground that Medtronic had retained the patent specialist "with an eye to litiga-
tion."88 The court stated: "If the prospect of litigation is identifiable because of
specific claims that have already arisen, the fact that . . . litigation is still a
contingency has not been held to render the [work-product] privilege inappli-
cable. 89 The fact that no attorney had been consulted in 1967 was held to be
immaterial.90
Thus, the lines are drawn as to what "anticipation of litigation" means. One
must ask (1) whether a specific claim is identifiable, and (2) whether employ-
ment of counsel is necessary. The following continuum of situations illustrates
the variation in possible resolutions under the two approaches.
a. Case is begun; party retains attorney who investigates or directs
others to investigate.
b. Case is not begun, but the party, knowing that litigation will fol-
low, consults an attorney who begins an investigation.
c. Case is not begun, but an incident has occurred causing the party
reasonably to believe that litigation may follow; the party consults an
attorney who begins an investigation.
d. Case is not begun, but an incident has occurred causing the party
reasonably to believe that litigation may follow; without consulting
counsel, the party or his representative (not an attorney) begins an
investigation.
e. Case is not begun and no specfic incident has yet occurred, but
from the factual situation the party reasonably believes that there is a
attorney's documents made prior to the issuance of a subpoena are not part of the litigation effort and
are not protected by the work-product doctrine. Prior to the first subpoena to a bank officer, the attor-
ney did nothing more than advise the bank concerning possible future obligations.
80. 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972).
81. Id at 148.
82. Id at 149.
83. 56 F.R.D. 426 (D. Mass. 1972).
84. Id at 428.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id at 429.
88. Id at 430-31.
89. Id at 431 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
90. Id
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good possibility that an incident may occur resulting in litigation;
with or without consulting counsel, the party or his representative
begins an investigation.
Certainly in (a) and (b) the investigation and resulting documents will al-
ways be considered to be in anticipation of litigation. Variation (c) is slightly
more difficult because the party has only a reasonable belief that litigation will
follow; however, inasmuch as counsel has been consulted and is directing the
investiation, the resulting documents should still benefit from work-product
protection. The problem occurs in variation (d). The Thomas Organ line of
cases would deny protection because counsel has not been consulted, but the
Almaguer line would grant protection because a specific claim has arisen. Va-
riation (e) would probably carry with it no work-product protection under
either approach.
The test that should be followed, if the rule is to be applied as written,
should focus on whether there exists (1) a cause of action with identifiable
potential parties; and (2) a reasonable probability that a suit will be brought.
If such be the case, then documents and other tangible things gathered should
be treated as prepared in anticipation of litigation and granted work-product
protection. Despite the express language of rule 26(b)(3), and the Almaguer
line of cases that recognizes the work-product protection when a specific claim
is identifiable, some courts might still insist that an attorney be involved if the
doctrine is to apply because there is a presumption that the document was not
prepared in anticipation of litigation unless "an attorney's legal expertise" is
involved.91
The other issue in the "in-anticipation-of-litigation" dispute is whether the
work for which protection is sought was prepared in the ordinary course of
business.92 If a report or other document has been prepared in the ordinary
course of business, it is deemed not to have been prepared in anticipation of
litigation and therefore has no work-product protection. The difficulty lies in
drawing a distinction between the two.
A report that is regularly drawn for bookkeeping, accounting, personnel, or
other purposes is done in the ordinary course of business, even though it may
be quite useful or even essential in preparation for litigation.93 Further, a re-
port that is required by a statute or governmental regulation is not protected as
work product even though counsel may have worked on or may have given
advice in the report's preparation, and the report concerns a specific incident
from which litigation may reasonably be expected.94 A report or document is
deemed prepared in anticipation of litigation and within work-product protec-
tion only if that report or document was made for litigation purposes and not
required by statute or by government regulation.95
When these principles are applied in a corporate setting, it is clear that, de-
91. See Thomas Organ, 54 F.R.D. at 372; supra text accompanying notes 60-69 (discussing Thomas
Organ).92. homas Organ, 54 F.R.D. at 372.
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note ("[m]aterials assembled in the ordinary
course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation
purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision").
94. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle Inc., 320 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1963); Galambus v. Consolidated
Freightways, 64 F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
95. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("[a]dvising a
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spite the language of Federal Rule 26(b)(3) which would appear to make it
unnecessary to bring counsel into the investigation, it is always safer to bring
counsel into an investigation as early as possible. Indeed, corporate counsel,
whether in-house or otherwise, should direct the investigation. This has not at
all been modified by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Upjohn Co. v.
United States,96 which held that employees' questionnaires distributed by cor-
porate counsel were protected by the work-product doctrine. 97 In fact, the
Court emphasized the involvement of counsel and the importance of the role
of counsel.98
IV. OVERCOMING WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION
The work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege; it can be overcome. The
party who asserts work-product protection for the item sought to be discovered
has the burden of establishing that it was prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion.99 When that requirement is satisfied, the burden shifts to the party seek-
ing discovery to overcome the qualified work-product protection.' °°
To overcome work-product protection, a party seeking discovery must
demonstrate two things: (1) he has "substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case"; 101 and, (2) he is "unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."102
An understanding of substantial need begins with Hickman v. Taylor. 0 3 In
Hickman the Court rejected the argument that a party seeking discovery can
overcome work-product protection merely by showing that the material sought
is relevant to the subject matter of the action, and does not fall within the
attorney-client privilege.' ° 4 The Court also rejected a slightly more restrictive
test that would have allowed material to be discovered as long as it is relevant
to the issues expected to be tried.10 5 Instead, the Court spoke of necessity or
justification beyond relevancy, and of the requirement that the material be
essential to the proper preparation of a client's case.' 06
Subsequent cases have required a special showing of the importance of the
materials sought to the discovering party's case. 107 One court has equated
"substantial need" with "the critical materiality" of the information and the
"distinct trial advantage" that the other party may have unless discovery is
permitted.108 The Eighth Circuit- has ruled that substantial need is not shown
client about matters which may or even likely will ultimately come to litigation does not satisfy the 'in
anticipation of standard' "); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 42-43 (D. Md. 1974).
96. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
97. Id at 397-99. See supra note 30 (discussing applicability of work-product doctrine to in-house
counsel).
98. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-99.
99. Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 88 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
100. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947).
101. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
102. Id
103. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
104. Id at 509-10.
105. Id at 508-09.
106. Id at 511-13.
107. See Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 37, 40 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (showing of
undue hardship or resulting injustice required).
108. Rackers v. Siegfried, 54 F.R.D. 24, 26 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
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by an affidavit alleging merely that such discovery would "'expedite' the case,
'facilitate the production of proof, 'narrow the issues', and 'reduce the evi-
dence' needed at trial.10 9 With respect to witness interviews and statements,
another court has rejected a substantial need argument because the party al-
ready had interviewed the witnesses in question and had taken statements
from several others.110 Under this rationale, in order to establish substantial
need, the party seeking discovery would have to show that some reason exists
to suspect that the statements in his possession are not as complete or as accu-
rate as those for which discovery is sought."1
At least one court has held that discovery of a witness' statement for contra-
diction or impeachment purposes is insufficient to overcome work-product
protection." 2 Other courts, however, have held that impeachment purposes
demonstrate "substantial need" if the party seeking discovery had attempted to
depose the witness and then shows a "persuasive reason for the court to believe
that. . .[the] statement [sought] would be materially different."' ' 3
If a party shows substantial need, he must then show that he cannot obtain
the substantial equivalent of the material sought by any other means without
undue hardship. Some situations easily satisfy the requirement: the witness
cannot be found, has died, or is otherwise unavailable; or the witness is antag-
onistic, will not cooperate, or claims memory loss. 114
A clear example of the problems involved in applying the undue hardship
standard occurred in the Xerox v. IBM 51 5 litigation in New York. Xerox had
accused IBM of seeking to enter the dry-paper photocopying market by hiring
away Xerox employees and using Xerox's trade secrets provided by those em-
ployees. 116 IBM counsel interviewed and obtained written statements from
thirty-seven IBM employees, including those who had worked for Xerox and
those who had worked closely with the former Xerox employees. 117 Counsel
for Xerox thereafter interviewed twenty-three of those thirty-seven IBM em-
109. Brennan v. Engineered Prods., 506 F.2d 299, 303 (8th Cir. 1974).
110. Hodgson v. GMAC, 54 F.R.D. 445, 446 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
Ill. id
112. Dingier v. Halcyon Lijn N.V., 50 F.R.D. 211, 212 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
113. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Strauss, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 536, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1971); cf. Haarhues v.
Gordon, 180 Neb. 189, 198, 141 N.W. 2d 856, 863 (1966) (discovering party must attempt to obtain
witness' statement before court entertains discovery motion).
The Hickman Court acknowledged the potential need for discovery of witnesses' statements for im-
peachment purposes. 329 U.S. at 511. The Court stated:
Where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where produc-
tion of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had.
Such written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in
evidence or give clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful
for purposes of impeachment or corroboration.
id
114. Xerox v. IBM, 64 F.R.D. 367, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (discovery of attorney's notes ordered fol-
lowing plaintifs deposition of defendant's employees who refused to cooperate). After Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 383, the result in Xerox might be different because the statements of the IBM employees would
arguably come within the corporate attorney-client privilege as defined in Upjohn. See supra note 36
(discussing impact of Upjohn).
115. 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
116. Id. at 369.
117. Id. at 375.
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ployees and found that not one of them had any memory of pertinent facts." 8
Xerox then sought discovery of all the statements taken by IBM counsel.' 19
Chief Judge Edelstein held that, as for the twenty-three employees whom
Xerox had interviewed and who had had no memory, Xerox had satisfied the
court that it could not by other means obtain the substantial equivalent of the
statements; therefore, the court ordered IBM counsel to turn over the state-
ments of those employees.' 20 As for the remaining fourteen employees inter-
viewed by IBM, the court required Xerox to interview each one to ascertain
whether he or she could remember and, if so, whether the individual would
cooperate.' 2 ' Only for those who lacked memory or failed to cooperate would
Xerox be able to obtain written statements from IBM counsel. 122
A different question arises when the party seeking discovery simply shows
that the witness is an employee of the opposing party. One view is that such a
showing is a factor in establishing substantial need because such a witness will
necessarily be reluctant to cooperate.'2 3 Another view is that the bare allega-
tion is not enough; the party seeking discovery must attempt to interview the
employee and show the employees' actual reluctance or unwillingness to coop-
erate.' 24 Another permutation of the concept of unavailability is the situation
in which the witness is a long distance away, and it is claimed that the expense
of interviewing that witness is prohibitive in light of the amount at issue in a
particular case. When such facts have been established, it has been held that
the witness is "unavailable" and the undue hardship requirement is thus
satisfied. '5
An interesting application of these principles has been suggested by psycho-
logical studies that show a sharp decrease in memory within the first few days
after an incident.' 2 6 Based upon these studies, some courts have ruled that the
party seeking discovery of statements taken shortly after the incident (within
hours or a few days at most) cannot obtain the "substantial equivalent" of
those statements after the first week has passed.'2 7 Thus, the extremely diligent
party or counsel, who gets on top of a case immediately after the incident, is
forced to turn over witnesses' statements, whereas the procrastinating party is
not similarly penalized by having to turn over his work product. At least one
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 382.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 128 (5th Cir. 1968).
124. Almauger v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147, 149 (D. Neb. 1972); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Strauss, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 536, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discovering party must attempt to
obtain employee's statement; no assumption of adversity).
125. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 322, 325-26 (D.P.R. 1974).
126. See Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 975, 977 (E.D. La. 1974) (discussing psychologi-
cal studies showing rapid decrease in memory).
127. Teribery v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 68 F.R.D. 46, 47-48 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Hamilton v. Canal Barge
Co., 395 F. Supp. 975, 977-78 (E.D. La. 1974); Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Gillman and Teribery, the courts emphasized that the cases were wrongful death
actions and that plaintiffs' decedents had not been able to tell their versions of what had occurred.
Discovery of statements taken by the defendant shortly after the occurrence appeared to be viewed as a
method of lessening the relative disadvantages that each plaintiff had suffered because of this lack of
information. Teribery, 68 F.R.D. at 47-48; Gillman, 53 F.R.D. at 318-19.
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court has rejected this reasoning, ruling that passage of time alone is never
conclusive.128 Instead, the party seeking discovery must show that he has inter-
viewed the witness and that the witness claimed loss of memory or that the
interviewer has positive evidence of such loss of memory. 29 Only then, these
courts have ruled, has the person seeking discovery shown that he cannot ob-
tain the substantial equivalent by interviewing the witness himself. 3
0
Another interesting aspect of the substantial equivalence problem concerns
rebuttal evidence; the paradigm is the surveillance film. In a personal injury
case in which the plaintiff is claiming physical incapacity, plaintiff's counsel
may wish to know whether surreptitious surveillance films have been made. If
so, he may desire to see them as part of discovery. The defendant usually
counters that the film is clearly work product; it was made in anticipation of
litigation or for trial, and plaintiff's counsel can obtain the substantial
equivalent of the information on the film merely by asking the plaintiff what
activities he has in fact engaged in. Some courts have gone along with such
arguments, and thus have denied discovery. 131 A number of courts, however,
have rejected that position and maintained that discovery of surveillance films
is necessary to allow cross-examination of those who prepared the films be-
cause full disclosure allows examination of the film to determine its accuracy,
reliability, and probative value. 132 Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York ordered production of a surveillance film during discovery, ruling
that the plaintiff could not obtain the "substantial equivalent" of the actual
film itself.133 He stated that "while surprise has a healthy prophylactic effect
against possible perjury, on balance, cases are more likely to be decided fairly
on their merits if the parties are aware of all of the evidence."' 134
V. OPINION WORK PRODUCT: ENHANCED PROTECTION
Federal rule 26(b)(3) provides that "the court shall protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor-
ney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation."'' 35 The rule is
the codification of the Supreme Court's holding in Hickman v. Taylor,136 in
which the plaintiff sought discovery of the written statements of witnesses and
"the exact provisions of any. . . oral statements or reports" made by the wit-
128. Almaguer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147, 150 (D. Neb. 1972). One can
only speculate whether the result in Almaguer might have been different if plaintiffs' counsel had
brought in the type of expert testimony on psychological studies that convinced the court in Hamilton
v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 975, 977 (E.D. La. 1974) (accounts by five eyewitnesses of barge
accident held discoverable due to time lapse; psychological studies demonstrated decrease in memory
over time).
129. Almaguer, 55 F.R.D. at 150.
130. Id.
131. Bogatay v. Montour R.R., 177 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
132. Martin v. Long Island R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53, 54-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Snead v. American Export,
59 F.R.D. 148, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D.
Pa. 1959); ef Blyther v. Northern Lines, 61 F.R.D. 610, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discovering party must pay
for reproduction of surveillance film).
133. Martin v. Long Island R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
134. Id
135. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
136. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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nesses to defendants' counsel. 137 The Supreme Court ruled that this discovery
request should be denied:
[A]s to oral statements made by witnesses to [defendant's counsel]
whether presently in the form of his mental impressions or memo-
randa, we do not believe that any showing of necessity can be made
under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production. Under
ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all the
witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary
gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness. No
legitimate purpose is served by such production. The practice forces
the attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to
write down regarding the witnesses' remarks. Such testimony could
not qualify as evidence; and to use it for impeachment or corrobora-
tive purposes would make the attorney much less an officer of the
court and much more an ordinary witness. The standards of the pro-
fession would thereby suffer.138
As clear as Hickman and rule 26(b)(3) may be, several questions are left
unanswered. First, does everything in the attorney's mind fall within the cate-
gories of "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories"? Sec-
ond, is the protection absolute and unbreachable, or is it simply an enhanced
protection requiring a higher showing of substantial need and inability to ob-
tain the substabtial equivalent before the work-product protection can be over-
come? Finally, does the absolute, or at least enhanced, protection apply solely
to the work product of an attorney or someone operating under the direction of
an attorney, or does it also operate as a protection for a party's representative
who is not an attorney or operating under the direction of an attorney?
Although the language of the rule appears to include everything in the attor-
ney's memory, and Hickman extends protection to the attorney's memory and
to the attorney's notes from memory, at least one case distinguishes "creative
legal thought" of the attorney from a "mere recognition of observed fact."
'139
In the latter situation there is a greater readiness to permit discovery if all
other aspects of work-product protection are overcome.
Some courts have held that the protection of attorneys' mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, and legal theories is absolute. 140 This view is buttressed
by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which proposed the language of
rule 26(b)(3).
The Hickman opinion drew special attention to the need for protect-
ing an attorney against discovery of memoranda prepared from rec-
ollection of oral interviews. The courts have steadfastly safeguarded
against disclosure of lawyers' mental impressions and legal theories,
as well as mental impressions and subjective evaluations of investiga-
tors and claim-agents. In enforcing this provision of the subdivision,
137. I d at 508.
138. Id at 512-13 (emphasis added).
139. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1199-1200 (D.S.C. 1974).
140. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Booth, 399 F. Supp. 975,
978 n.1 (D.S.C. 1975).
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the courts will sometimes find it necessary to order disclosure of a
document but with portions deleted. 141
Despite the apparent absolutist language of the rule, some courts have been
reluctant to be quite so firm. Judge Hemphill in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milli-
ken, Inc. 142 stated that "as the work product of the attorney becomes less a
matter of creative legal thought and more a mere recognition of observed fact,
the work product becomes increasingly susceptible to discovery."'1 43 In Xerox
v. IBM,144 Judge Edelstein held that attorneys' mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, and legal theories "are to be protected when feasible, but not
at the expense of hiding the non-privileged facts from adversaries or the
court."1
4 5
Although the issue of opinion work-product protection was recently
presented to the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States,146 the Court
failed to provide a conclusive answer. 147 The Court noted the dichotomy be-
tween courts which have held that no showing of necessity can overcome pro-
tection of work product which "contains personal recollections, notes, and
memoranda pertaining to conversation with witnesses,"'148 and those that have
refused to adopt an absolute rule. It recognized, however, that such material is
entitled to "special protection."1 49 The Court declined to decide whether such
material would always be protected by the work-product rule, but stated that
the appropriate standard would be "far stronger" than the rule 26(b)(3) stan-
dard of "substantial need" and "without undue hardship" inappropriately em-
ployed by the magistrate.' 50
Another issue that must be addressed is whether this enhanced protection
applies to the opinion work product of a party's agent who acts outside the
control of an attorney. Rule 26(b)(3) specifically protects the opinion work
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
142. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975).
143. Id at 1200 (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage (II), 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974); see also
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) ("'opinion work product' is the
most sacrosanct"); Zucker v. Sable, 72 F.R.D. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (newspapers, magazine articles, and
advertisements "assembled during routine investigation by counsel do not receive the qualified immu-
nity afforded an attorney's 'work product' ").
144. 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
145. Id at 381.
146. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Court held that the attorney-client privilege applied to the attorney's
written record of employee responses to the attorney's interview questions. The attorney's notes and
memoranda of interviews that went beyond recordation of those responses, however, were held not to
be protected by the attorney-client privilege but were protected, if at all, by the work-product doctrine.
Id at 397.
147. Id at 401 (Court "not prepared" to say mental processes always protected by work-product
rule).
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id The Court stated:
The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are work product based
on oral statements. If they reveal communications, they are, in this case, protected by the
attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications, they reveal the
attorney's mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26 and Hickman
make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need
and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.
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product "of an attorney or other representative of a party." 151 Although the
Advisory Committee noted that "the courts have steadfastly safeguarded"
opinion work product of investigators and claim agents, 152 it did not cite any
authority for this broad assertion.
Some courts have taken up the issue, however, and relied upon the Advisory
Committee's language to protect the mental impressions of claim agents and
investigators. In Spaulding v. Denton,153 the court allowed discovery of two
marine surveyor's reports made prior to the retention of counsel and prior to
the making of a claim, that is, made in the "ordinary course of business." 154 A
third report made in "anticipation of litigation"-the insurer by this time had
retained counsel-but without theparticipation or direction of counsel was held
to be immune from discovery because the discoveror's "only need for the...
report [was] his wish to know the opinions and conclusions of' the marine
surveyor.155
VI. PARTY STATEMENTS
According to the explicit language of the rule, a party may obtain from op-
posing counsel a copy of his own statement given to opposing counsel or some
other representative of the opposing party without showing either substantial
need or the inability to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means.'
56
Thus, in the classic situation in which an insurance adjuster obtains a written
statement from the injured party in his hospital bed before the party has had
an opportunity to retain counsel, the party can obtain a copy of that statement
merely by making a request. No showing of any kind is required. The court,
however, may permit a deposition to be taken of that party before the request
for the statement is honored.' 57 Similarly, a non-party witness can obtain,
merely by request, a copy of his statement concerning the action given to coun-
sel or other representative of a party.' 58 Although the cases were divided on
this point before the 1970 rewriting of the rule, 159 the paucity of case law since
1970 indicates that this provision of the rule is working without difficulty.
151. Id FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis supplied).
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(3) advisory commitee note.
153. 68 F.R.D. 342 (D. Del. 1975); see supra text accompanying notes 70-78 (discussing Spaulding).
154. Spaulding, 68 F.R.D. at 346.
155. Id; see also Duplan v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1976) (opinion
work-product protection applies equally to lawyers and non-lawyers); 4 J. MOORE & J. LUcAS,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64 [3], at 26-416 (2d ed. 1982). Moore's Federal Practice states that
under the new language, [the 1970 amendment of Rule 26(b)(3)] however, there will be no
technical distinction between materials prepared by the attorney in the case and those that are
prepared by a claim agent, insurer, or other agent of the party, or by the party himself. Inso-
far as the "work product" doctrine is concerned, each will be judged upon the need to protect
the privacy of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, of the attorney
or other representative of the party.
Id
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committe note.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
159. Compare Smith v. Central Linen Serv. Co., 39 F.RD. 15, 18 (D. Md. 1966) (no showing re-
quired) with Safeway Stores v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (showing of "good cause"
required).
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VII. WAIVER OF WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION
Before discussing waiver of the work-product protection, this qualified pro-
tection must first be distinguished from the absolute attorney-client privilege.
Because the attorney-client privilege is intended to protect client confidences, it
belongs to and may be waived only by the client. 160 Work-product protection,
by contrast, is intended to promote an attorney's preparation and representa-
tion in the adversary process. Traditionally, therefore, it has belonged to the
attorney, and only the attorney could waive it.161 Recently, however, some
courts have found that voluntary disclosure of information by the client can
act as a waiver of work-product protection.
In In re Sealed Case162 a multinational corporation resisted a grand jury
subpoena for its in-house counsel's records pertaining to the corporation's par-
ticipation in the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program.163 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that, although work-product protection was usually
available for such reports, previous disclosure by the corporation in the SEC's
Voluntary Disclosure Program waived that protection.' 64 The court ordered
production of the attorney's work product,165 stating that, "when a corporation
elects to partcipate in a voluntary disclosure program like the SEC's, it neces-
sarily decides that the benefits of participation outweigh the benefits of confi-
dentiality for all files necessary to a full evaluation of its disclosures."' 166 The
voluntary disclosure waiver of work-product protection was held to apply
equally to opinion work product which usually enjoys enhanced protection.' 67
Judge Wright compared this "voluntary disclosure" waiver to the waiver of
the attorney-client privilege identified in United States v. Cote. 168 In Cote the
Eighth Circuit held that "when a taxpayer files an amended return it waives its
attorney-client privilege for workpapers that would otherwise come within the
privilege, because submission of an amended return necessarily implies con-
sent for the IRS to examine the details underlying the information .... $$169
160. J. McCoRMICK, McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 92, at 192 (E. Cleary
2d ed. 1972).
161. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.. 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons,
90 F.R.D. 583, 587 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Waiver of the attorney-client privilege does not waive work-prod-
uct protection. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (work-product protection
broader than attorney-client privilege; work-product protects both attorney-client relationship and indi-
vidual attorney interest that client does not share).
162. 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
163. Id A Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) is a program designed to encourage corporations to
perform voluntarily in-house investigations of suspected corporate improprieties in order to save the
SEC time and money. Id at 800. In return, the SEC offers participating corporations "leniency for past
abuses and a chance to avoid extended formal investigation and litigation."Id at 801. By participating
in a VDP, the corporation agrees to make accessible to the SEC all material necessary to corroborate
the findings of the in-house investigation. Id
164. Id at 822-23. The court did note, however, that "[c]orporations may protect their privileges
... simply by... identifying material as to which they claim privilege at the time they submit their
voluntary disclosure reports. They will, of course, bear the risk that their reports will not be accepted as
full disclosures." Id at 823.
165. Id at 825.
166. Id at 822.
167. Id at 824-25.
168. 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
169. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 822 n.124 (citing United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144-45 (8th
Cir. 1972)).
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Reading Cote and In re Sealed Case together, it is clear that when a client
makes a representation to a government agency-in Cote, a tax return filed
with the IRS; in In re Sealed Case, a Voluntary Disclosure Report to the
SEC-the client waives all privileges and protections concerning files, papers,
and other documents that support that representation.
In In re Sealed Case Judge Wright would not hold that client conduct al-
ways may be the basis for waiver of work-product protection. He stated:
Courts have often recognized that the interests of attorneys and those
of their clients may not always be the same. To the extent that the
interests do not conflict, attorneys should be entitled to claim [work-
product] privilege even f their clients have relinquished their claims.170
Accordingly, Judge Wright suggested that an attorney neither guilty of nor
participating in any fraud or crime could claim work-product protection even
if the client had impliedly waived work-product protection by perpetration of
fraud. 7 1 The Seventh Circuit adopted such a position in In re Special Septem-
ber 1978 Grand Jury.172
In that case the client asked his attorney to file contribution disclosure re-
ports with the board of elections.1 73 Because the client failed to provide his
attorney with accurate information, fraudulent reports were filed. 174 A subse-
quent grand jury investigation included the issuance of subpoenae duces tecum
to the attorney, who successfully moved to quash them by asserting work-
product protection. 175 The district court recognized that there had been ongo-
ing client fraud, but ruled that in the absence of the attorney's complicity in
the fraud the work-product protection remained vital. 176 The government ap-
pealed and the Seventh Circuit applied a bifurcated analysis that undercut
simple work-product protection and yet maintained opinion work-product
protection. 77 In support of its holding, the court said:
We reach this result because we are persuaded that the strong policy
disfavoring client fraud requires that the client relinquish the benefit
he would gain from the work product doctrine, which benefit is just
as real although it is his attorney, rather than he, who asserts the
doctrine. We are persuaded, however, that the attorney's mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories must still be pro-
tected in order to avoid an invasion of the attorney's necessary
privacy in his work, an invasion not justified by the misfortune of
representing a fraudulent client.' 78
The Seventh Circuit's dual analysis protects the attorney's legitimate privacy
interest without allowing the client to misuse that protection for his own fraud-
ulent ends.
170. Id at 809 n.56 (emphasis supplied).
171. Id at 812.
172. 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980).
173. Id at 53-55.
174. Id at 55.
175. Id at 53-54.
176. Id at 55.
177. Id at 63.
178. Id
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Another form of waiver of work-product protection may occur when there is
voluntary disclosure to another person who does not have a common interest
in the outcome of the litigation. It should be noted, however, that, according
to Professors Wright and Miller, "disclosure of a document to third persons
does not waive the work-product immunity unless it has substantially in-
creased the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the informa-
tion."'' 7 9 Thus, disclosure to co-counsel or counsel representing another party
who shares an interest in the disposition of major issues in the case does not
constitute waiver of the protection. 80 Disclosure to an adversary, however,
constitutes a complete waiver of the privilege. 18'
Waiver also occurs when a party uses protected material or witnesses to his
advantage. In United States v. Nobles18 2 the Supreme Court ruled that, al-
though work-product protection existed for an investigator's report made upon
the request of counsel, protection was waived insofar as the investigator's testi-
mony relied upon or made reference to the report. 8 3 Waiver also occurs when
a document, otherwise protected as work product, is given to a witness to re-
fresh his memory.'84 In addition, if counsel submits an affidavit of an expert
witness in support of a motion for summary judgment, one court has found
that counsel waives his work-product protection of statements and reports
made by that witness which pertain to the affidavit. 8 5
Finally, work-product protection will probably be waived if it is used in
complete bad faith.18 6 In United States v. Reserve Mining Co. 187 the court
found that the defendants engaged in bad faith misrepresentations to the court
by withholding alternatives to their polluting procedures and by failing to re-
spond truthfully or fully to plaintiff's interrogatories concerning alternatives to
those procedures. 88 The court stated that, even if these alternatives had mer-
ited work-product protection, the "bad faith" manner in which they were with-
held suggested waiver as an appropriate court-imposed sanction. 8 9
179. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 210 (1970); see also
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (unlike attorney-client privilege, work-product
protection not automatically waived by disclosure to third party).
180. See Stix Prod., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(third party disclosure of legal opinion to plaintiff not waiver of work-product protection when third
party's interest in litigation "substantially identical" to plaintifis interest).
The attorney-client privilege may also extend to insulate information disclosed to counsel represent-
ing other parties with similar interests in the litigation. See generally Wilson, Using the Joint Defense
Privilege, Nat'l L.J., March 14, 1983, at 13, col. 1 (discussing use of attorney-client privilege to protect
communications between attorneys made during a joint defense).
181. D'Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
182. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
183. Id at 239 & n.14; see also Shaw v. Wuttke, 28 Wis. 2d 448, 456, 137 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1965)
(when individual, who previously made protected written statement, becomes witness at trial, attorney's
work-product protection vanishes).
184. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Il. 1972); cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court acknowledged proposition that "materials con-
sidered work product should be withheld from prospective witnesses if they are to be withheld from
opposing parties" but denied disclosure because work product used to prepare expert witness),
185. American Ladder & Scaffold Co. v. Eadie, 120 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
186. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 711 (D. Minn. 1976); f Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (room to allow discovery when plan
exists to "exceed decent limits of preparation on the one hand and concealment on the other").
187. 412 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1976).
188. Id at 710-11.
189. Id at 711.
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VIII. SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
An area of much controversy is the invocation of work-product protection
when a document has been prepared in anticipation of previous litigation. The
Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that the work-product protection contin-
ues because the intrusion on the attorney is the same whether the issue arises in
the litigation for which the document was prepared or in subsequent litiga-
tion.190 Conversely, the Second Circuit and the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania have held that work-product protection applies in subsequent
litigation only if the two cases are closely related.191 Several other courts have
rejected both of these views, holding that, once a case has ended and the subse-
quent litigation does not involve the same parties, work-product protection is
no longer needed and should not be carried over to subsequent litigation.
192
Because neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Advisory Com-
mittee's notes supply any guidance on this issue, the conflict probably will con-
tinue until the matter is settled by the Supreme Court.
IX. USE OF EXPERTS
Rule 26(b)(4) provides special discovery rules concerning expert wit-
nesses.' 93 This is an extension of the work-product doctrine because experts
are not witnesses to what happened; instead, they furnish opinions on causa-
tion, prognosis, interpretation of data, and other matters of informed specula-
tion. Experts function to aid the fact-finder when the fact-finder requires
assistance in interpreting and applying data. Thus, experts must be distin-
guished from actors, who actually participated in or witnessed the incident.
94
Rule 26(b)(4) divides experts who have been consulted into two categories:
those whom counsel plans to call as witnesses at trial 195 and those whom he
does not plan to call.' 96 The need for disclosure exists only for those experts
whom counsel intends to call as witnesses, because opposing counsel needs to
be familiar enough with the expert's proposed in-court testimony to prepare
cross-examination.
The rule requires that upon a proper interrogatory a party must identify
each person whom he expects to call as an expert witness, state the subject
190. United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1976); Duplan Corp. v. Mou-
linage (I), 487 F.2d 480, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Neugebauer v. A.S. Abell Co., 77 F.R.D. 712,
714 (D. Md. 1978).
191. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967); Midland Inv. Co. v.
Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1967); f SCM v. Xerox, 70 F.R.D. 508, 516 (D. Conn. 1976)
(material prepared in anticipation of other litigation protected when underlying dispute of that litiga-
tion not settled).
192. Honeywell Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 119 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407,410 (M.D. Pa. 1962); Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v.
Transamerican Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Del. 1954).
193. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(4).
194. Inspiration Consol. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Rodrigues v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. 11, 12 (W.D. Pa. 1972); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litig., 54 F.R.D. 384, 385
(E.D. La. 1972); Duke Gardens Found., Inc. v. Universal Restoration, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 365, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
195. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
196. FED. R. Ci,. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
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matter on which the expert is expected to testify, present the substance of the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and provide a
summary of the grounds for each opinion. 197 The response to this interro-
gatory must be more than conclusory; it must be truly informative. 198 Thus, a
response stating that the expert would testify on the "extent of any medical
problems" and that he based his opinions on "office records" was held to be
insufficient by the District Court for the District of Columbia. 99 Similiarly,
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held the statement that the
subject matter of the expert's testimony is "machine design, electrical circuitry,
and human factors engineering" to be insufficient.200 Moreover, even after
counsel has served an interrogatory requesting the identity and opinions of an
opposing party's expert and that interrogatory is answered, the responding
party has a continuing duty to name any additional experts whom the respond-
ing party decides to call as witnesses at trial, and to furnish all of the required
information concerning those experts.20 1
After a satisfactory response to an interrogatory is received, a party may
move for "further discovery by other means" concerning the expert.202 The
party may request that counsel in possession of the expert's report or deposi-
tion furnish such materials.20 3 Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) provides that the court, in
granting the motion, may make such order "concerning fees and expenses as
the court may deem appropriate."20 4 The issue has arisen as to whether this
provision merely protects the nonmoving party from having to pay additional
fees for his opponent's discovery (and, perhaps, forces the party seeking dis-
covery to share in the expert witness' preparatory fees to date) or whether it
also requires the moving party to show substantial need for this additional
discovery. Indeed, the rule specifically provides that a court has the power to
require the discovering party to pay the retaining party "a fair portion of the
fees and expenses reasonably incurred" by the retaining party "in obtaining
facts and opinions from the expert. ' 20 5 This indicates a concern that one party
not bear the entire financial burden for the retention of and investigation by an
expert whose findings are shared with the non-retaining party. Although one
interpretation of this provision is that the rule is designed solely to ensure equi-
table cost sharing without requiring a showing beyond the relevant-and-not-
privileged standard of the general discovery rule, rule 26(b)(1), 20 6 some courts
have held that further discovery of the expert beyond the interrogatory is only
indicated if substantial need is shown.207
The second group of experts--those not to be called at trial-are treated
differently. The rule specifically provides that one party may "discover facts
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
198. See Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 371 (D.D.C. 1973).
199. Id at 371 & n.5.
200. Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111, 112 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
201. FED. R. Cwy. P. 26(e)(1)(B).
202. FED. R. Cwv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
203. Id.
204. Id; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (discussing fees and expenses).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(ii).
206. Herbst v. ITI, 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1975).
207. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202,205 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Wilson v. Resnick, 51
F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially em-
ployed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial,"
and who is not to be called as a witness at trial, "only. .. upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. °2 0 8
The only exception pertains to medical reports that are discoverable through
the procedure provided in rule 35(b). 209
An additional issue is raised by rule 26(b)(4): is an in-house expert one who
"has been retained or specially employed" as an expert "in anticipation of liti-
gation or preparation for trial"? The Eastern District of Virginia faced that
issue when a large electric utility corporation consulted one of its employees
and then argued that that employee was an expert.210 The court rejected the
argument, holding that the employee was not an expert within the meaning of
rule 26(b)(4) because he was neither "specifically employed" by the corpora-
tion nor "put on the payroll for the specific purpose of deriving facts and opin-
ions for use in trial preparation for anticipated litigation."2 1' The court
reasoned that experts must owe primary allegiance to their work as experts and
not to the employer corporation. 212 The court apparently believed that the ob-
jectivity required of an expert is compromised in that situation.213 Therefore,
the court ruled, an employee of a party can never be an expert.2 14 In contrast,
the District Court for the District of Kansas, in an almost identical factual
situation, held that an employee who was a partner in an accounting firm may
be deemed an expert within the meaning of this rule as long as he has not
worked on the matter in controversy.215
Ordinary discovery may be used to obtain (a) information from an expert
who has not been retained in anticipation of litigation or for trial, but whose
information and reports are relied upon by the party against whom discovery
is sought;216 (b) information obtained by an expert as an actor or viewer with
respect to the events in controversy;217 and, (c) information possessed by a
party himself when he is an expert in his own right.21
8
A collateral issue arises if one party has "informally consulted" with an ex-
pert, but has neither retained him for the particular litigation nor specifically
made evidentiary use of the expert's opinions. In such circumstances both rule
26(b)(4), generally governing expert discovery, and rule 26(b)(1), governing the
208. F.D. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
209. FED R. Civ. P. 35(b) (physician's report regarding examination discoverable).
210. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 407 (E.D. Va.
1975).
211. Id
212. Id
213. Id The court stated that "though one be an expert, if his contact with the case is not in his
capacity as an impartial observer, but is instead as one going about his duties as a loyal employee, then
one 'should be treated as an ordinary witness."' Id
214. Id; cf. FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note (general employee not specifically
employed on case not expert).
215. Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69, 72 (D. Kan. 1975); see also Breedlove v. Beech Air-
craft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 204-05 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
216. See Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342, 346 (D. Del. 1975).
217. See Duke Gardens Found., Inc. v. Universal Restoration, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 365, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
218. See Rodrigues v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. 11, 12 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
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scope of discovery, have been held to be inapplicable; discovery is not avail-
able at all. 219
Discovery of experts who were specifically employed in anticipation of liti-
gation, but who are not to be called at trial is permissible only in "exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable" to obtain the information by
other means. 220 Counsel can discover, however, the identity of such experts
because it is only through such identification that the discovering party may
determine whether the exceptional circumstances have been met.22'
What constitutes exceptional circumstances is not easy to articulate. Two
contrasting cases are helpful. The first case was an employment discrimination
action.222 In anticipation of litigation the defendant engaged a nontrial expert
to evaluate employment aptitude tests that the defendant company had been
administering.223 The plaintiff sought discovery of that expert and his report
on the ground that the plaintiff anticipated a good faith defense and needed
the report of this expert to establish intent and subjective state of mind.224 The
court rejected that argument and held that sufficient "substantial need" had
not been shown.225
In the second case, the plaintiff provided the defendant with printouts from
a computerized model of the Texas beer market. 226 Later, the defendant
wanted further discovery of the expert who constructed the computer program,
even though that expert was not to be called at trial by the plaintiff.227 The
court permitted such discovery because it found that an understanding of the
detailed structure of the computer model was required to decipher the com-
puter printouts and to prepare for thorough cross-examination. 228
Finally, there are sanctions for not playing by the rules. Although sanctions
generally are imposed for violations of the discovery rules, the specific sanction
called into play here permits the discovering party to take the deposition of the
expert at the other party's expense or, in extreme cases, precludes the expert
from testifying at all. 229 The most common violation is the failure to advise the
other side about an expert witness to be called at trial until the eve of trial or
during trial. Some judges are quite disturbed by such tactics, and have fash-
219. Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The 1970 Advisory Committee's Note to rule
26(b)(4) states that the rule "precludes discovery against experts who were informally consulted in
preparation for trial, but not retained or specially employed." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory com-
mittee note.
220. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
221. This discovery may be obtained under rule 26(b)(1), which sets forth the general scope of dis-
covery. Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony, Inc. v.
Continental Ins., 63 F.R.D. 113, 114 (D. Del. 1974). Contra Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278,
280 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (no identification of expert not to be called at trial).
222. Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974).
223. Id at 319.
224. Id at 320.
225. Id
226. Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
227. Id at 1134-35.
228. Id at 1138-40.
229. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 57 (D.N.J. 1975); cf. Weiss v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1975) (appellate court recognized district court's option of pre-
cluding testimony as sanction but its exclusion of expert testimony constituted "manifest error" in the
case sub judice).
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ioned these sanctions to do justice to all parties, as well as to discourage future
abuses.230
CONCLUSION
In summary, the work-product protection is just that: a protection. It has
not yet been fully elevated to the status of a privilege. The protection's pri-
mary function is not to protect the interests of any particular individual-
plaintiff, defendant, or counsel. Rather, it is designed to benefit the adversary
system itself and to produce an atmosphere in which counsel for both sides can
fully prepare and present their clients' best case without the stifling self-editing
that would be necessary if an attorney's work product were subject to un-
checked discovery. Challenges to an invocation of work-product protection are
best viewed with an understanding that the work-product doctrine protects the
adversary system. When that system ceases to reap those benefits, the protec-
tion is vitiated despite what may best serve individual interests.
230. The Supreme Court has recognized the prophylactic effect of discovery sanctions. See National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam) (sanction of
dismissal not merely penalty to offending party but deterrent to others tempted to ignore discovery
orders).
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